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INTRODUCTION 
Networks are essential components of our national infrastructure. However, those 
networks could be used by terrorists seeking to attack dense urban populations with 
weapons of mass destruction. In particular, large urban road networks provide many 
routes that terrorists could use to get close enough to a major city to make a harmful 
attack. One approach envisioned for protecting urban areas from such attack is to 
deploy (human-operated or fully automatic) sensors on the roads around cities to detect 
terrorists and their weapons so they can be stopped before they come within range of 
their targets. A key challenge to such an approach concerns how many sensors to buy 
and where to locate them. Indeed, the size and density of road networks would seem to 
make the cost of buying and operating these sensors prohibitive by requiring placement 
of sensors on hundreds if not thousands of road segments in order to protect any large 
city. 
This challenge led to the work reported here, which shows that, contrary to first 
appearances, the number of sensors required to cover every possible route into a city is 
not prohibitively large. We apply graph theory to find a minimum cut set for a road 
network; i.e., to find a smallest set of road segments on which sensors must be placed to 
ensure that a terrorist traveling across the road network must encounter at least one 
sensor. We applied this theory to the actual road network of the New York City 
metropolitan area, and found that the minimum cut set was about 104 times smaller 
than the number of road segments in the network—the road network had approximately 
one million road segments and it yielded a minimum cut set of eighty-nine road 
segments. Thus, the minimum cut set problem for large urban road networks can be 
solved. Furthermore, the solution shows that the size of the cut set alone does not make 
it impractical to deploy a system of sensors that would cover all of the routes into the 
city on the road network.1   
The work reported here specifically concerns finding optimal locations for sensors for 
detecting terrorists, weapons, or other dangerous materials on roads leading into major 
cities. However, this work is generally applicable to finding minimum cut sets for any 
large network. It could be used to find optimal sensor locations on other transportation 
networks like railroads or subways. It could also be used to support offensive operations 
by locating a smallest set of segments in an adversary’s network that would have to be 
cut in order to completely stop the flow through the network. Thus, the methodology 
presented here could have utility in other homeland security and military analyses. 
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There is considerable literature on graph theory, network optimization, and the 
minimum cut set problem. The references at the end of this article specifically address 
the minimum cut set problem. The accomplishments of the work reported here were a) 
to find and implement a practical way of solving large networks for minimum cut sets 
and b) to discover that the minimum cut set for a large U.S. urban road network was 
much smaller than what might have been expected given the number of road segments 
in the network. 
ANALYTICAL PROBLEM 
Terrorists seeking to attack a large city might use the roads leading into that city to 
transport personnel, weapons, or other dangerous materials. One approach for 
preventing such attacks is to deploy sensors on those roads to detect the movement and 
allow the interdiction of these entities before the terrorists reach their destination. To 
evaluate the feasibility of this approach, we would like to know the smallest number of 
sensors that must be deployed to ensure that a terrorist traveling into a city would 
encounter a sensor, and, of course, where to locate those sensors. Thus, we sought a 
methodology that could find a minimum cut set in a city’s road network.2 
The particular question addressed is as follows. Suppose an adversary has personnel, 
weapons, or other dangerous material at some distance from an urban area, and that the 
adversary can transport these on the roads of that area to move them into the interior of 
that area. Suppose sensors can be placed along the side of any road segment in that area. 
Then what is the minimum number of sensors needed, and where should these sensors 
be placed, so that a vehicle using any of the roads in the road network of that urban area 
must pass at least one sensor in going from any exterior location to any interior 
location? This paper explains the methodology and presents some results of applying 
that methodology to the New York City metropolitan area. 
METHODOLOGY 
If the road networks involved had been small enough, there would have been no 
methodological problem to solve. Solving for a minimum cut set is a well-known 
network problem, and existing map data and network solvers could have been used to 
answer the question posed above (see the references for discussions of this network 
problem). However, the road networks around major urban areas are very large; for 
example, the road network around New York City contains over one million road 
segments. Several, otherwise appropriate, network solvers cannot solve a problem this 
large. 
New York is the largest and, perhaps, the most important city in the United States. It 
was attacked on September 11, 2001 and in 1993. Accordingly, a methodology that could 
not handle the New York region’s road network would not be of interest, while one that 
could make it there would (likely) make it anywhere. Therefore, it was important that 
the methodology could be successfully applied to the New York region. So it was decided 
to test this methodology by identifying potential sensor locations—minimum cut sets—
for the New York metropolitan area road network. 
To analyze the road network around New York, we obtained a geographic information 
system database that contained all of the road segments in the U.S., where a road 
segment is defined as the portion of a road between consecutive intersections with other 
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roads.  Thus, a road segment is a positive length of road rather than a point. (The length 
of these segments may provide some flexibility in locating sensors on a road network.) 
The database also includes some “false nodes” that are created when an otherwise 
straight road makes a turn that is not at an intersection. Such false nodes add to the size 
of the network but they do not affect the solution for the minimum cut set. 
The database contains information that characterizes each road segment, both 
geographically and functionally, and it includes residential streets, urban alleyways, and 
other paths that are navigable vehicular routes. It is derived from hundreds of sources 
and is maintained and updated on a frequent basis. Thus, the database is perishable and 
must be updated (or the minimum cut sets must be otherwise verified) to ensure that 
the analysis produces valid results. 
To obtain an accurate solution for a minimum cut set, one must have high quality data.  
Data that left out road segments, or contained errors regarding where the segments are 
connected, could give rise to false overall results. Assessing the quality of such a large 
database is difficult. The database that we used is a subset of the data from a 
commercially available product known as the “JServer” database. JServer data are 
normally accessed via custom applications to derive optimized trucking delivery routes 
and driver directions. 
For this application, we assessed the quality of the data by comparing JServer data for 
Washington, D.C. streets against some known anomalies. In these visual comparisons, 
the data correctly identified blocked alleyways and traffic-circle entries and exits, which 
were sources of errors in other database products that we examined. 
In addition, and more importantly, we subsequently evaluated our New York City cut 
sets visually and contextually against overhead images in Google Earth to see if there 
were any roads that bypassed the cut sets.3 This examination showed that our data and 
cut sets were remarkably consistent with the Google Earth overhead photographic raster 
imagery. Moreover, the compatibility of the database with the MapInfo Professional 
Geographic Information System allowed us to directly superimpose our minimum cut 
sets on the Google Earth imagery. This facilitated the manual examination and 
confirmation of the validity of the cut sets. 
When we performed the Google Earth overhead imagery analysis to confirm the 
validity of the cut sets, we also looked to see where an adversary might be able to avoid 
road segments with sensors by driving off-road (e.g., through parking lots). We found 
about half a dozen locations where this might be possible. Thus, off-road routes do not 
appear to be a major factor in determining the number of sensors required. However, 
finding and blocking such routes to prevent an adversary from bypassing the sensors (as 
well as confirming the validity of the minimum cut set) could be important when 
designing a real urban road network sensor system. 
The first step in this process of designing a sensor barrier is to determine where, in a 
general sense, the barrier is to be located. The methodology identifies a minimum cut 
set in the network, but one must first decide in what part of the network to put the 
minimum cut set. In our case, because we wanted a barrier surrounding the center of a 
city, we defined the barrier’s general location in terms of its distance from the center of 
the city. After determining the general area in which the barrier will be located, the 
second step is to apply the methodology to find a minimum cut set in that general 
location. 
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To determine where a minimum cut set was to be located, we drew two concentric 
circles around a central point in the urban area in question. The terrorists are assumed 
to start at an unknown (to us) location outside the outer circle, with the intention of 
reaching an unknown (to us) location inside the inner circle. The actual road network 
considered consists of those road segments that have at least one node (i.e., endpoint) 
between these two concentric circles.4 
For this demonstration, the outer circle was a forty-five-mile radius circle centered at 
Times Square and the inner circle was a concentric fifteen-mile radius circle. Thus, the 
network considered is essentially contained in a thirty-mile-wide ring around 
Manhattan. Sensors on a minimum cut set within such a ring would allow an attack to 
be detected and potentially interdicted at least fifteen miles from Times Square. A ring 
of such width encompasses a large road network and so gives the network solver the 
potential to find a small minimum cut set. Figures 1 and 2 below depict these fifteen- 
and forty-five-mile circular boundary lines and the road segments contained in the 
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The ring shown in Figure 2 contains 488,951 road segments, 414,640 of which are from 
two-way road segments (which we converted into two one-way segments) and the other 
74,311 are from one-way road segments. There are 722 road segments that cross the 






























Figure 2.  New York City region road segments between the forty-five- and fifteen-mile boundaries 
 
It is important to note that these boundaries can be selected in any reasonable manner 
desired and they can be of any reasonable size or shape. The choice to use circles here is 
not a restriction of the methodology but rather is a choice of convenience for this initial 
investigatory analysis. The boundaries we used in our example would be suitable for 
designing a sensor system to protect the high population density areas around New York 
City. However, one could use boundaries closer in (and of a conforming shape) to design 
a system to protect a smaller area, e.g., Manhattan, or boundaries farther out to protect 
a larger area, e.g., New York and Philadelphia. 
It is interesting to note (Figure 1) that the density of the road network decreases as one 
moves away from the cities. Thus, the minimum cut set for a larger region might be 
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smaller than the minimum cut set for a smaller region (despite the larger region’s longer 
perimeter) if the larger region extended into the low-density portion of the road 
network. Minimum cut sets that we have prepared for the New York region using 
fifteen-mile wide rings subsequent to the analysis reported here have demonstrated that 
property. The minimum cut set can also be smaller if the network boundaries are drawn 
so as to include areas where the road density is limited by the presence of natural 
barriers like rivers. For example, a minimum cut set for Manhattan Island would consist 
of the limited number of bridges and tunnels connecting the island to the surrounding 
areas. 
An interesting and somewhat counterintuitive property of these boundaries is that, as 
a ring is expanded (by increasing the outer radius, decreasing the inner radius, or both), 
the minimum cut set can get smaller but not larger.  To see this, imagine a narrower ring 
A whose inner and outer boundaries lie between the inner and outer boundaries of a 
wider ring B. Every cut set for ring A must also be a cut set for ring B, but not vice-versa.  
Thus, the minimum cut set for ring B can be no larger than the minimum cut set for ring 
A. It is also possible that a cut set for ring B will be smaller than a minimum cut set for 
ring A. Thus, a minimum cut set for ring B must be as small as, or smaller than, a 
minimum cut set for ring A. 
Figure 3 gives a less detailed map of the fifteen-mile-radius disk of Figure 1—but it 
shows relevant city names and major route numbers.  Figure 4 gives a less detailed map 
of the forty-five-mile disk—but it also shows relevant city names and major route 
numbers.  Figures 3 and 4 are not drawn to the same scale as each other or to the scale 
of Figures 1, 2, 5, and 6. 
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Figure 3.  A less detailed map of the fifteen-mile-radius disk given in Figure 1 
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Figure 4.  A less detailed map of the forty-five-mile-radius disk given on Figure 2 
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The second step in our process was to find a minimum cut set for the road network 
whose segments have one or both nodes between these boundary lines. This is a well-
known problem in graph theory, and it might be expected that there would be many 
solvers that could be used to obtain a solution to it. However, all but one of the solvers 
we considered could not find minimum cut sets in networks as large as the road network 
surrounding New York City. One, the GNET solver, could do so. Several solvers were 
Excel-based, and so were restricted by the size limitations of Excel. Others could only 
accept the problem in the form of a general linear program and their LP-interfaces were 
unable to handle the problem. As a result, it took significant effort for us to identify just 
one solver that could find minimum cut sets in networks as large as the road network 
surrounding New York City. That one was the GNET solver. 
GNET is a proprietary network solver that runs on an Intel-based PC under MS 
Windows.5  (See G.H. Bradley, et al. [1977] for a description of GNET’s theoretical 
basis.)  GNET generates a minimum cut set when given a mathematical description of a 
network, which was obtained from JServer. GNET is designed to handle very large 
networks, and our experience so far is that it can handle networks of over one million 
arcs. 
To let the max-flow algorithm find a minimal cut set, the following structure was used.  
Each of the segments with both nodes inside the ring was given a capacity of 1. An 
artificial “super-source” node was added outside the outer ring, and an artificial “super-
sink” node was added inside the inner ring. The outer node of each segment crossing the 
outer ring was changed to this super-source node and these segments were given an 
infinite capacity. Similarly, the inner node of each segment crossing the inner ring was 
changed to this super-sink node, and these segments were also given an infinite 
capacity. Finally, an artificial road segment going from the super-sink to the super-
source was added, also with an infinite capacity. 
Some network analyses are concerned with the different capacities of the individual 
arcs in the network because they seek to ascertain the effect of cutting sets of arcs on the 
network capacity or the flow through individual arcs in the network. In our case, while 
real roads have different traffic capacities, we assigned all real road segments a capacity 
of 1 because we sought to find the minimum cut set that would block (cover) all paths 
through the network. 
Finding a minimum cut set requires preparing the road network data in the manner 
described here.  This would be easy to do with ninety road segments, but is less so with 
900,000. To re-structure the network into nodes and one-way arcs, we converted each 
of the 414,640 two-way road segments between two nodes into two segments running in 
opposite directions between those two nodes. We also created one super-source node 
and one super-sink node. This yielded a total of 903,591 road segments with both of 
their nodes inside of the ring on Figure 2 plus 1,430 boundary-crossing road segments. 
Accounting for all of these road segments, plus the super-sink to super-source segment, 
produced a total of 905,022 road segments. 
We then solved this network for its maximum flow and, hence, for a minimum cut set.  
This minimum cut set gives the smallest number of sensors that must be deployed in 
order to ensure that any vehicle attempting to penetrate the inner (fifteen-mile) circle, 
starting on any road from outside of the outer (forty-five-mile) circle, will necessarily 
encounter at least one sensor. It should be noted that there could be more than one 
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minimum cut set, and if there is more than one, the cut sets may or may not include 
some of the same road segments. 
In other applications, one might not only be concerned about transportation into a 
city, but also about transportation from points within the city to points outside the city, 
and from points within the city to other points within the city. This methodology has the 
tested capability to find minimum cut sets for outward transportation as well as inward. 
It should be noted that neither the real New York City road network nor our 
representation of it, is symmetric.  One-way streets and highways can make the number 
of routes available to travel inward different from the number available to travel 
outward. Thus, there can be differences between the solution to the forward (outside-to-
inside) problem and the solution to the reverse (inside-to-outside) problem. We 
demonstrate a solution to the outward transportation problem below. 
RESULTS 
Figure 5 shows a minimum cut set for the network described above.  It contains eighty-
nine road segments.  Figure 5 is too coarse to identify the particular road segments that 
constitute this cut set. The precise identity of these road segments is contained in the 
output data files produced in the network analysis. 
We believe that the results of this analysis are quite surprising.  In particular, the result 
that only eighty-nine sensor locations are required to cover every possible vehicular 
route into the fifteen-mile disk around Times Square is unexpected and 
counterintuitive. That number is about one one-hundredth of one percent of the 
829,820 road segments in the network (not counting the notional source-connecting 
and sink-connecting segments). It is also about 10 percent of the number of road 
segments that cross the outer forty-five-mile radius boundary (722) or the inner fifteen-
mile radius boundary (708). Therefore, building a sensor barrier around New York City 
on a minimum cut set would be considerably more efficient than simply placing a sensor 
on each road segment that crossed the inner boundary or that crossed the outer 
boundary of the network. Thus, while building a road network sensor barrier around 
New York City might have initially appeared to be impractical, the eighty-nine-segment 
cut set shows that this is not necessarily so. 
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Figure 5.  New York region road segments between the forty-five- and fifteen-mile radii circles 
showing the eighty-nine minimum cut-set segments, and a twenty-five-mile intermediate radius 
circle. 
 
Another observation one can make about the road network surrounding New York City 
is that, as depicted in Figure 5, eighty-six of the eighty-nine cut set segments are outside 
a twenty-five-mile intermediate radius. Accordingly, if sensors were deployed on this cut 
set, and if the adversary were to choose a route at random such that encountering any 
sensor was equally as likely as encountering any other sensor, then it would be twenty-
eight times more likely for the encounter to occur more than twenty-five miles from 
Times Square than within twenty-five miles of Times Square. 
As stated above, our methodology is able to solve for outward as well as inward 
transportation. As a demonstration, we solved for a minimum cut set for the same area 
(the ring between fifteen and forty-five miles from Times Square) by assuming that the 
vehicle would begin inside the inner ring and move to a point outside the outer ring. 
Figure 6 depicts both the inward (blue) and outward (pink) minimum cuts sets that 
were generated in this test. 
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There are eighty-nine road segments in both the inbound and outbound minimum cut 
sets. If the road network were symmetric (which it is not), then an inbound minimum 
cut set would always be paired with a corresponding outbound minimum cut set.  
However, for asymmetric networks, there need not be any such relationship. 
 
 Figure 6. Forward and reverse flow minimum cut sets for forty-five to fifteen mile radii 
 
This paper demonstrates the ability to find a minimum cut set for a road network 
containing over one million segments. Accordingly, there is good reason to believe that a 
minimum cut set around any single population center in United States can be found. 
However, it is possible that one might need to analyze larger networks to identify 
minimum cut sets that encompass multiple cities or regions. GNET’s developers think 
that GNET could handle networks as large as four million arcs. But beyond that size, 
more memory and computer CPU power will be required than is currently available on 
single core PCs (like those that were used here). Nevertheless, one might be able to 
analyze entire regions of the United States with our existing arrangement of hardware 
and software by judiciously selecting the network boundaries. 
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BARRIERS WITH FEWER SENSORS 
Until now, we have assumed that the number of sensors deployed would be equal to the 
number of road segments in a minimum cut set. However, one might wish to build a 
defensive system (barrier) with fewer sensors than cut set segments. If we have no 
knowledge of which route a terrorist may take in trying to traverse the barrier, and if the 
terrorist has no advance knowledge of where we will place our sensors, then the optimal 
approach is for us to deploy our sensors randomly (uniformly and independently) across 
the segments of a minimum cut set, with no more than one sensor per cut set segment. 
This would yield a probability of the terrorist encountering a sensor equal to the number 
of sensors divided by the number of segments in the minimum cut set. Such a system 
would provide some level of protection and might be sufficient to deter an attack. 
The assumptions underlying this result are important. If the terrorists knew the 
locations of our sensors ahead of time (and we had fewer sensors than cut set segments), 
then they would simply choose an undefended route and avoid all of the sensors. On the 
other hand, if we knew that the terrorists had preferences for taking certain routes over 
others, independent of our deployment of sensors, then we could place our sensors to 
cover those routes to maximize the probability of an encounter with a sensor. These 
possibilities suggest that we should consider concealing or frequently relocating our 
sensors so that terrorists will not know where they are. 
NEXT STEPS 
We found that a minimum cut set for New York City’s road network contains many 
fewer segments than the network as a whole, and fewer even than the number of 
segments that are intersected by large circles drawn around the city. But New York is 
hardly a typical city. It could be worthwhile to apply this methodology to other cities to 
see if their minimum cut sets exhibited similar characteristics. Different road network 
locations and layouts might cause minimum cut sets to be relatively larger or smaller 
than they are for New York City. 
Our results for New York City suggest that this methodology could be a useful tool for 
designing a system of terrorism countermeasures on an urban road network (or some 
other transportation network, e.g., rail or subway). However, solving for a minimum cut 
set is only one step in that process. After a cut set is found, it needs to be checked for 
ways that an adversary could bypass the cut segments (i.e., sensor locations) by driving 
off road or by using roads not shown on the map. When designing a real system, bypass 
possibilities and constraints on constructing, operating, and servicing equipment should 
be considered when selecting sensor locations. 
After identifying potential sensor locations, system-level cost-effectiveness analyses 
(with an appropriate cost model) or risk management analyses could determine how 
many sensors to acquire and deploy. Analyses could address the performance of the 
sensors in terms of the rates of false negatives and false positives for different entities 
(terrorists, weapons, materials) as well as the effect of false positives on urban area 
traffic. They might address the vulnerability of the sensor system to scouting and 
spoofing by the adversary. They might address the availability and capabilities of 
interdicting forces to stop vehicles that give positive responses without allowing 
terrorists to release their weapons. Analyses might consider the potential for an effective 
countermeasure system to deter an adversary from attacking the city in the first place. 
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IDA has addressed these issues in other research it has performed. Nevertheless, the 
methodology discussed in this article should be valuable for enabling the design of 
urban road network sensor systems by solving the urban road network minimum cut set 
problem. 
As a final note, this work has only addressed the location of sensors on roads. Research 
addressing the more general problem of protecting geographic areas from attack would 
also consider detecting and interdicting terrorists on alternative attack pathways 
employing air, water, or off-road land transportation as relevant. 
SUMMARY 
We have developed a methodology to help find optimal locations for sensors for 
detecting entities or materials transported on roadways around urban regions in the 
United States. The methodology uses graph theory to solve the maximum flow problem 
and identify a minimum cut set in networks containing over one million road segments. 
We applied the methodology to the road network of the New York City metropolitan 
area and found that, for a ring between fifteen and forty-five miles from Times Square, 
the minimum cut set contained only eighty-nine segments. This methodology and 
analysis is significant for two reasons. First, to our knowledge, networks as large as the 
road network around New York have not previously been analyzed for minimum cut 
sets.  Second, the minimum cut set we found is much smaller than what one might have 
expected from the number of road segments in the network. 
This methodology is potentially broadly applicable. It could be used to find optimal 
locations for sensors intended to detect, or defenses intended to interdict, any materials 
or entities on roads or on any other network. It could also be used to support offensive 
operations by locating the smallest set of segments in an adversary’s network to cut in 
order to completely stop flow through that network. Thus, this methodology could have 
utility in other homeland security and military analyses. 
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1  Guaranteeing an encounter with a sensor is only the first step in designing a system; it does not guarantee that the 
terrorist or his weapons would be detected or interdicted.  As we discuss briefly at the end of the article, in 
designing a sensor system to be deployed around a city, one would also consider the ability of sensors to detect, 
and response forces to interdict, the terrorists who encountered the sensors. 
2  An alternative to placing sensors would be to simply block roads (permanently or temporarily).  Placing a sensor 
or a roadblock on each of the minimum cut set road segments would ensure that an adversary would encounter 
either a sensor or a blocked road en route to the interior of the urban region.  To simplify the discussion, 
henceforth the article speaks in terms of placing sensors rather than roadblocks. 
3  The overhead imagery analysis was performed at IDA by Adam Mulliken and Robert Kraig. 
4 This assumes that there is no single road segment that has one node outside the outer boundary and one inside the 
inner boundary.  However, it would be easy to handle such road segments, if, in future cases, any were to exist. 
5 Insight, Inc., Manassas, VA, copyright 1975, 1982, 1999, and 2006. 
